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ABSTRACT 
The notion of public relations contributing to the fabric of society is heavily contested 
in the public sphere and under-researched by the academy. The authors of this paper 
propose that the study of the relevance of public relations to society can be 
enlightened by turning to economics. Using information asymmetry as a framework, 
the argument is that public relations can be analyzed as a social institution that both 
helps to mitigate market imperfections and consequently increases the efficiency with 
which society’s resources are allocated as well as the chances for more market 
participants to derive value out of economic transactions.  
 
1. Public relations and society 
The notion of public relations contributing to the fabric of society is heavily 
contested in the public sphere and under-researched by the academy. As long as this 
remains the case, public relations will not complete the “route to professionalism” 
(Meyer & Leonard, 2013). After all, the contemporary lists of requirements for 
achieving professional status of public relations all include some form of constitutive 
or sustaining role for society (Cameron, Sallot & Weaver-Lariscy, 1996; Cutlip, 
Center & Broom, 2006; Niemann-Struweg & Meintjes, 2008; Parsons, 2004). 
Instead, public debate about public relations often focuses on the possible 
harm inflicted upon society, with, e.g. the Economist claiming that “PR man has 
conquered the world” (18 December, 2010: 128) and is, according to the International 
Herald Tribune (31 January, 2012: 16) ladling out “slop meant to obscure rather than 
reveal.” 
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The public relations academy has not provided a counter narrative of equal 
weight. This is, first, because the organization – not society – is its prevalent level of 
analysis, as inspired by the excellence study (Grunig, 2006; Grunig et al. 2002), 
which remains the dominant paradigm for the field (Botan & Hazleton, 2009; L’Etang 
& Pieczka, 2006). Consequently, the public relations academy mostly theorizes from 
the viewpoint of managerial rationality and simply implies  - mostly without 
investigation - that public relations at least does no societal harm, because it enables 
dialog as an enactment of mutual balancing between organizations and their publics 
(Demetrious, 2006).  
Second, postmodern and particularly critical scholars repudiate the notion of 
public relations contributing to society. They contend that dialogic public relations 
perpetuates the hegemony of corporations over their environment and of “western” 
forms of corporate capitalism over marginalized communities and societies in general 
(Dutta, 2012; Leitch & Neilson, 1996, 2001; L’Etang & Pieczka, 2006; Munshi & 
Kurian, 2005). Society will be harmed, they contend, by public relations because it 
serves to maintain managerial hegemony “through the making of concessions at key 
areas of contestation” (Roper, 2005, p. 70; Demetrious, 2013). 
Third, the academy has failed to connect public relations with society because 
the few scholars who use a macroscopic perspective have remained over-shadowed by 
the organizational paradigm. Investigations of public relations as a macro-social 
phenomenon are typically made by the academy in Europe, but with little impact 
beyond the continent. The seminal work by Ihlen et al. (2009) and the special issue of 
Public Relations Review (33/2007) started the application of grand social theory to 
public relations. The more specific question of how public relations and society 
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interlink has been tackled by scholars (Ronneberger & Ruehl, 1992; Burkart & 
Probst, 1991) using, for example, Luhmann’s (1989, 1990, 1995) social systems 
theory as well as Habermas’ (1981) communicative action theory. Heath (2006, 2013) 
has developed the notion of public relations assisting in the workings of a “fully 
functioning society” and democracy, building on the arguments of other rhetorical 
scholars such as Pearson (1989) and Toth and Heath (1992). However, all of these 
approaches have had limited impact on the debate about what public relations 
contributes or is to society. 
A gap remains in public relations scholarship that brings organization and 
society together (Gregory, 2012). Organizations are actors beyond their managerial 
utility and they contribute to, shape and help define society. Indeed the language of 
business in particular, increasingly permeates public discourse. Hence, discussing the 
organizational level of analysis without including the societal perspective is partial.  
2.  An economic turn 
The authors of this paper propose that the study of the relevance of public 
relations to society can be enlightened by turning to economics, which does not have 
the same bifurcation between organization and society and is “widely seen as the most 
advanced of the social sciences with its mathematical formalization, public prestige 
and Nobel prize awards” (Ioannides & Nielson, 2007: 1). This requires accepting the 
economic axiom that society as a whole can and should benefit from economy as long 
as markets – provided they function – allow a society to distribute its scarce 
resources. 
Wildman (2008), Podnar (2009) and a special issue of Public Relations 
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Review (35/2009) have reminded the communication academy more generally of the 
potential of economic theory and of traditional schools of economic thought. McKie 
& Lawniczak (2009: 337) lament the lack of attention to economics and call for 
macro-economic input into public relations theory (Lawniczak, 2009). However, 
turning to economic theory for insights by public relations scholars has been limited 
(e.g. Willis, 2012). The authors suspect that this has to do with the educational 
background of practitioners and academics and their lack of familiarity with economic 
theory, and also with the “autistic condition” (Ioannides & Nielson, 2007: 1) of 
(neo)classical economics that traditionally uses idealized mathematical models and is 
not open to contingent social factors.  
It is now appropriate to apply economic theory more specifically to public 
relations because economic theory has changed. The recent economic crises have 
fundamentally called into question the value of (neo)classic economic thought. In 
response, economic theories that veer away from the classic homo economicus are 
gaining traction since they offer richer explanations of “how the economy really 
works” (Akerlof & Shiller, 2009: 5) by incorporating the human condition. Two of 
these richer models have been awarded Nobel Prizes and are at the core of current 
economic debate: information asymmetry, as advanced by Akerlof (2000), Spence 
(1973, 1974, 1980) and Stiglitz (1975, 2001a,b), and “common-pool resources,” as 
described by Ostrom (1990, 2009). This paper focuses on the first of these two.  
3. The market context of public relations 
The authors’ argument is that public relations can be analyzed as a social 
institution that helps to mitigate market imperfections and consequently both 
increases the efficiency with which society’s resources are allocated and increases the 
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chances for more market participants to derive value out of economic transactions.  
Akerlof, Spence and Stiglitz’ starting point is the refutation of the assumption 
that markets are moved toward perfect efficiency by the “invisible hand”. They 
challenge the (neo)classical economic axiom that market participants decide 
rationally, ultimately allowing every market to reach an equilibrium, of which a 
good’s price is the most important reflection (also called the “optimal efficiency” by 
Adam Smith). In work spanning over four decades, the three Nobel laureates - 
Akerlof, Spence  and Stiglitz -   describe how markets in reality diverge 
fundamentally from that assumption, thereby inhibiting the ability and propensity of 
rational decision-making and ultimately damaging the capacity of markets to allocate 
society’s scarce resources efficiently. Crucially for the argument about relevance to 
society, these imperfections also limit the equitable distribution of economic 
participation and welfare (Stiglitz & Walsh, 2006: 239-246). 
More specifically for public relations, Akerlof, Spence and Stiglitz reject the 
notion that any market participant has all the relevant information about the 
transactions in which he or she chooses to engage, whether that is about the quality of 
goods, the nature of the relationship with the other party, the prices of all goods or so-
called externalities. Externalities are the positive or negative consequences that are 
produced by a specific transaction, a field of transactions or an entire market, but for 
which the costs are not borne by the participants of the transaction and are therefore 
not included in the pricing system. For example, when a company moves its 
operations offshore, the social and economic impact on local communities in the 
country it is leaving is not borne by the company. While (neo)classical economic 
theorists mostly exclude these externalities from their analyses and assume that they 
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will over time be included in the price system (particularly given the globalized, 
highly networked economy), theorists of imperfect markets posit not only that the 
price system is incapable of reflecting externalities, but also that market participants 
are constantly at risk of remaining unaware of these external costs, thus making it 
more unlikely for a market to produce outcomes to society’s benefit.  
According to Spence (2012), markets “are tools that, relative to the 
alternatives, happen to have great strengths with respect to incentives, efficiency, and 
innovation. But they are not perfect; they underperform in the presence of 
externalities […] informational gaps and asymmetries, and coordination problems 
when there are multiple equilibriums, some superior to others”. This means that 
buyers and sellers agree on prices that are too low if they don’t incorporate negative 
externalities (like pollution) or too high if positive externalities (like public health 
care services for a firm’s employees) are unknown or ignored.  
When market participants are clueless about costly externalities, the said 
market will fail to efficiently price and allocate society’s resources or will collapse 
altogether, as was famously first laid out by Akerlof (1970) for the sale of used cars. 
Buyers often only know the distribution of product quality, but not the quality of the 
specific item in a transaction, while sellers (like used car salesmen) know both. 
Akerlof called the damage done to markets by this imbalance “adverse selection”: 
When buyers become wary of hidden shortcomings, they will commit fewer 
resources, for they always risk being sold “lemons” (to use Akerlof’s term). This 
decreases the value of all commodities in that market, be they of low or high quality, 
thus making it inefficient for sellers of high quality to keep participating. As a result, 
that market’s efficiency is compromised: The incentive for sellers of high-quality 
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goods to withdraw from the market is high and an equilibrium is reached where only 
the worst products are sold. Adverse selection therefore reduces both the volume of a 
market as well as the average quality of its products. Consequently, the said market 
would have a socially less efficient outcome because not all gains from trade could be 
realized. Adverse selection has since proven to be a universal idea and a powerful 
analytical tool in the study of a wide range of markets, e.g. insurance, credit, mergers, 
employment, gift exchanges, wages, the caste system, sharecropping, etc. (Akerlof, 
1976, 1984).  
The parallels with public relations are apposite. Here we take a forced 
example to make the point. Practitioners (sellers) could be said to trade in the market 
of trust where they know both the generalities of the levels of trust around an issue 
(for example, pollution by the oil industry) and the specifics of trust around a 
particular incident (for example, a coastal oil spill). If the general population (buyers) 
discover that they have been misled on both the generalities and specifics they will, 
over time, invest less trust (adverse selection) in the oil industry and that sphere of 
discourse becomes devalued for all industry participants: the market’s efficiency 
(measured in levels of trust) becomes compromised. Furthermore, those 
communicators who sell honestly, for fear of becoming tarnished by the bad practices 
of those who sell dishonestly, could well decide to withdraw, leaving the market to 
the worst practices, devaluing the trust market even more. 
In a next step, which could be seen as even more relevant for public relations, 
Stiglitz focused on the underlying information asymmetries behind adverse selection 
and so provided the unifying term for the work by the three Nobel laureates. Stiglitz 
analyzed how “some of the most important conclusions of economic theory are not 
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robust to considerations of imperfect information” (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976: 629). 
Information, he proposes, is a public good which can never be optimally distributed 
by a private market (mostly because some information is too costly to get, relative to 
its benefit). When a party to a transaction has more relevant information than others, 
information is asymmetric and competitive markets become inefficient. It is therefore 
the privatization of information by some – not all – market participants that can 
ultimately lead to adverse selection. That this is to society’s detriment becomes 
particularly obvious when a party feels insufficiently informed about a transaction’s 
externalities (pollution, conditions of outsourced labor, etc.), or when a party suspects 
“moral hazard” (Arrow, 1963; Shapiro & Stiglitz, 1984; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; 
Stiglitz & Weiss, 1983), i.e., detrimental actions taken by the other party after a 
transaction has been agreed upon.  
4. The informational context of public relations 
With the Nobel Prize in 2001 for information asymmetry came the global 
acknowledgement “that understanding how information is obtained and disseminated 
is critical for understanding how economies function” (Barkley Rosser, 2003). More 
information – about a commodity, about its sellers, about the nature of the transaction 
between seller and buyer, about externalities and about the propensity of both sides to 
abide by the mutually accepted nature of their relationship – would reduce the 
asymmetries and preserve the abilities of markets to efficiently create wealth for 
societies. Even small, specific changes in the organization of information were shown 
to have major impact on markets, economies and societies (Akerlof & Yellen, 
1985a,b; Stiglitz, 2000). This “information economics revolution” was therefore also 
a call to the academy to provide specific insight into how markets can improve the 
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organization, creation and dissemination of information. 
Consequently, information asymmetry has generated a wide range of 
economic explanations of how social institutions emerge that can counteract market 
inefficiencies and failures (Loefgren et al., 2002). The public relations academy could 
have joined that debate and analyzed its own social phenomena and institutions, but 
didn’t (Wildmann, 2008). Instead, that analysis was also left to economists.  
Reputation, for example, was conceptualized by economists as a remedy 
against market failure caused by adverse selection (Kim, 2009): If buyers knew that 
the risk of getting ‘lemons’ from sellers was low, average prices would not be 
depressed and high-quality sellers might not be driven out of the market. Reputation 
is therefore a promise of quality. When information is asymmetric, economic actors 
will build reputation to maximize their own utility and secure repeated transactions. 
This rational investment into their own reputation prepares the ground for stable 
markets with more efficient outcomes. Building reputation becomes “an asset which 
can generate future rents” (Weigelt & Camerer, 1988: 443). However, this would only 
happen if the cost for building reputation were not prohibitively higher than its 
reward, as is the case in markets with infrequent repeat sales (Riley, 2001). Also, 
when the reward is not immediate, but economic actors need to maintain reputation 
strategies for a long time, their propensity to do so becomes lower (Mayhew, 2001). 
Possibly because its costs are easiest to specify, the economists’ debate around 
information asymmetry next turned to advertising as the principal reputation-building 
activity (Spence, 1980). In economic modeling, advertising creates market 
equilibriums by being a rational investment for firms with high-quality goods (who 
set up market-entry barriers), but from which sellers of low-quality goods will refrain 
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with equal rationality (Milgrom & Roberts, 1986; Nelson, 1974). 
5. An economic conceptualization of public relations  
However, the economic academy’s advances into reputation and 
communication do not yet suffice for an economic reconceptualization of public 
relations. Economists have not advanced into the – certainly relative to advertising – 
more dialogic nature of public relations. More importantly, public relations as a social 
institution comprises far more than market transactions and involves multiple 
stakeholders in a dialog about the very externalities identified by economic theory, 
like a firm’s carbon footprint, its workers’ conditions, its diversity policy, etc.  
The authors propose an economic conceptualization of public relations by 
understanding its role in the context of information asymmetry, which in turn enables 
the identification of its relevance to markets and society. 
5.1 public relations as signaling and screening  
As described above, economic actors benefit from investing in the reduction  
of information asymmetry, as it establishes their reputation and thus sustains the long-
term efficiency of the market in which they operate. In addition, if not for economic 
actors’ own investments, governments or other external bodies would regulate the 
market to reduce information asymmetry (e.g. compare the markets for hotels with 
those highly regulated markets for private education), thereby quite possibly creating 
even higher costs of compliance. 
Organizations and other economic actors resort to signaling (revealing 
discretionary information) and screening (giving information when forced to choose 
from a limited number of options given by the other party), e.g. when a corporation 
responds to activist investors or to a public agenda built by its critics (Spence, 1973, 
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2002; Stiglitz, 1975; Zoch & Molleda, 2006).  We propose that public relations can be 
understood as signaling and screening. 
Signals are voluntary, observable and costly investments in information that 
will allow receivers to better discern qualities that they can otherwise not assess (e.g. 
rankings to indicate the quality of universities, environmental certifications of 
corporations) and allow them to discern the height of the investment needed by the 
organization to send the signal.  
Screening is more closely related to risk than signaling. It is designed to avoid 
moral hazard by forcing senders to reveal information about their riskiness 
(Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976). A recent example is the prominent blogger Vani Hari 
(‘Foodbabe’) who gathered 44,000 signatures and challenged the world’s biggest 
brewers to list the potentially harmful ingredients in their beers for the first time. Two 
brewers quickly followed suit and revealed the information. 
5.2. Public relations counteracts adverse selection 
Spence (1973, 1974) proved the critical economic assumption that signaling 
only succeeds if the costs visibly vary between senders: the higher quality senders 
will find it less costly to do signaling and respond to screening than others, and this 
needs to be sufficiently apparent to recipients. For example, it is apparent to recipients 
that the costs to reputable organizations of living up to their signals is lower than to 
disreputable ones: Timberland, with its business model around reforestation in Brazil, 
risks much less when it comments on natural preservation than Nestle with its 
connection to palm-oil monocultures in Southeast Asia. The perceived cost (lost 
credibility and future market transactions) of misrepresentation is higher for the latter 
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(Spence, 1976) and “the signal will only signify something real if there is a negative 
correlation between signaling costs and […] capability” (Barkley Rosser, 2003: 8]. 
Public relations professionals might call this “the credibility gap,” where words (or 
other signals) and actions are seen to be out of kilter. 
While the proposed conceptualization of public relations is therefore most 
obvious for firms, it ultimately comprises every organization in a market economy, 
because even not-for-profit organizations depend on negotiating their resources in a 
competitive process for which the costs are lower the better the organization manages 
its relations to allied and opposing stakeholders.  
Also, signaling is the most effective in counteracting adverse selection when 
the quality that is being signaled is otherwise difficult to discern (Riley, 1975, 1979, 
2001). This is poignantly true for externalities and moral hazards, e.g. environmental 
impact, labor conditions, diversity, compliance, innovation, etc., that  make up the 
many themes in public relations today, as opposed to more product-related marketing 
communication. These externalities and an organization’s impact on them constitute, 
even if not discernable to parties, moral hazard.  
The authors therefore propose that public relations can be understood to 
reduce externalities and moral hazard, counteracting adverse selection in the long run. 
Public relations does not contribute to the actual productivity or efficiency of the 
sender, but rather to its ability to avoid becoming the victim of adverse selection, 
where the perceived value of all senders gravitates toward the bottom because market 
participants are unable to discern their differences (Kumar & Park, 2011). This can 
even be said to be the case in the public relations consulting industry itself, where the 
low reputation of the overall industry and an inability for consultants and agencies to 
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sufficiently distinguish themselves from others depresses consulting fees.  
5.3. Public relations contributes to the efficient allocation of a society’s resources 
Economists since Spence (1973) expect that signaling equilibriums are 
socially the most efficient in preserving markets: senders of high quality (for which 
the parameters vary, of course, and can be both strictly transactional as well as non-
monetary) opt for investing in the minimal amount of signaling required to 
discernably distinguish themselves from others. The rise of the internet does not, 
according to Spence (2002: 454), make information asymmetries obsolete, even 
though the cost of getting and exchanging information has shrunk dramatically in 
today’s networked societies, where information and power are diffusing (Naim, 
2013).  
Using an economic lens, public relations’ contribution to society can therefore 
be understood as the reduction of the relative ignorance of market participants about 
the nature of the transactions and relationships in which they engage, thereby 
contributing to markets’ efficiency in allocating society’s resources.  A current 
example is the move by some of the world’s major corporations toward “integrated 
reporting” of their transactions’ externalities, which is being driven by the accounting 
and public relations industries simultaneously (http://www.theiirc.org/). The ambition 
here is to give a true account of how the six types of capital upon which organizations 
draw from society (including financial, intellectual and relational) are enhanced so 
that a correct judgment can be made on whether the organization yields value to all 
the stakeholders that comprise that society.  
6. Outlook 
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Two major caveats will need to be addressed on the way toward an economic 
conceptualization of public relations. Firstly, the analytical value of the economic 
approach is highly contextual: Not only does it depend on the society in question 
having a market economy, in which both profit and not-for-profit organizations are 
allocated resources in a competitive process, but also on having a pluralist nature and 
one in which the governance sphere does not dominate, via its own claims and access 
to information flow, public debate and market power. These conditions often form the 
context for public relations in the so-called West, but rarely, for example, in any part 
of Asia (Halff & Gregory, 2014). So while information asymmetry models and 
economics in general are universalist, the conceptualization proposed in this paper 
can never be. Instead, the exact conditions under which it can add analytical value to 
the study of public relations have yet to be identified and incorporated into future 
analysis. 
Secondly, this economic conceptualization of public relations needs to face the 
charge of being more normative than analytical. After all, there are numerous 
examples in which public relations is detrimental to markets, and even to society 
(Demetrious, 2013): manipulative or propagandist public relations increases 
information asymmetry, prevents market efficiency from increasing  and reduces net 
aggregate wealth because of the cost involved in a spiral of competitive signaling 
(Spence, 1980). The economic conceptualization proposed here shares this caveat of 
alleged normativism with all “information asymmetry” models, which – according to 
both their main proponent (Stiglitz, 2002, 2006) and ideological opponents  - pave the 
way for government intervention and regulation in otherwise inefficient markets.  
This caveat is connected, and can only be resolved together with the 
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contextualization mentioned above: Where the right conditions prevail, public 
relations can have the macro-social relevance as described in economic terms. 
However, in the absence of these conditions, such conceptualizations will remain as 
normative as any call for market efficiency. We propose that the insights provided by 
economic models of information asymmetry provide opportunities for the public 
relations academy to deepen its understanding of the relationship between public 
relations and society, once the conditions under which this is true are identified in 
future research. Once those conditions are explained, the authors hope that the 
academy can provide a new avenue for theoretical reflection and contribute to the 
aspiration for public relations to become socially relevant and fulfill its higher 
obligation, as a profession, to serve the public good.  
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